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AGGRESSIVE CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN THAILAND: ROOTS 
OF HOSTILITY AND AGGRESSION
Violent conflict occurred in Southern Thailand in the year 2004. 
Since then, there has continued to be a spiral of violence without any 
sign of abatement. Events such as shooting, ambushing, bombing, 
arson, kidnapping and threatening letters constantly threaten the 
local inhabitants and exacerbate tensions between the Patani United 
Liberation Movement and the Thai government. Despite a pro-active 
effort by the Thai government and civil interest groups in searching for 
solutions, there has been no sign of a resolution. Therefore, this paper 
aims to contribute to this dialogue by exploring the roots of the conflict 
from the perspective of the ordinary people involved; especially those 
supporters of the Patani United Liberation Movement. Discussion 
will focus on the role of violence during the conflict and will also 
consider suggestions as to a resolution based on non-violent methods 
using an approach known as conflict transformation within peace and 
conflict psychology.
Keywords: Conflict in Southern Thailand, Patani Liberation Movement, 
violence and aggression, and potential solutions.
Introduction
The Patani Conflicts, better known as the Southern Thailand Conflicts, re-
emerged on January 4, 2004 when a military camp in Narathiwat province 
was attacked and robbed by an unknown group. In the attack, four military 
personnel were killed and 366 weapons were stolen (Yaacob 2009:16). Starting 
from this event, Patani was shaken again by several terrorist attacks including 
bombings, shootings, burning of schools, beheadings and kidnappings. The 
situation worsened as casualties and destruction of property were reported 
almost every day. According to the statistics released by the Centre for Conflict 
Studies and Cultural Diversity (CSCD), Prince of Songkhla University, 11,074 
incidents have occurred in seven years (January 2004 to August 2011), leading 
to 4,846 deaths and 7,995 injured. From these casualties, 2,856 (58.9%) were 
reported to be Muslims and 1,857 (38.3%) Buddhists. Among the injured, 
4,854 (60.7%) were Buddhists and 2,616 (32.7%) were Muslims (Jitpiromsri 
2011). The Thai government has been sending more than 60,000 members of 
the security forces, including the army, rangers, police and volunteers since 
2007 to maintain public safety and control the rebel movement (Statistics 
Jebat: Malaysian Journal of History, Politics & Strategic Studies, Vol. 40 (2) (December 2013): 24-43
@ School of History, Politics & Strategy, UKM; ISSN  2180-0251 (electronic), 0126-5644 (paper)
Jebat  Volume 40 (2) (December 2013) Page | 24
Aggressive Conflict in Southern Thailand: Roots of Hostility and Aggression
from Deep South Watch 2009). However, the conflict has not been overcome 
and the terrorist attacks still occur and  the number of deaths among civilians 
and security forces continues to increase. Although the security forces  were 
sent with  systematic strategies to control the Patani Liberation Movement 
Association (PLMA)1 and  find a solution to the conflict in Patani, there seems 
to be  no progress to a  permanent solution. These failures could be due to two 
core factors. First, the corrupt intention of the security forces who want  to 
continue manipulating this conflict in order to get the funding and budget from 
Bangkok for their personal gain. They behave in a nonchalant manner and 
sometimes their activities lead to conflict.2 Second, the shifting in approaches 
and strategies of the PLMA make it difficult for the security forces to track 
them down and arrest them.
Therefore, this article discusses the issues of why PLMA has 
resurrected its struggles after the silence in the 1980’s, and why they have 
chosen to continue the struggle. Furthermore, the article discusses why they 
are continuing with the hybrid policy of peace negotiations as well as violence. 
Here I will apply Ted Robert Gurr’s Relative Deprivation theory to understand 
and analyse the struggle of the PLMA. Therefore, this paper discusses the 
causes and changes in PLMA’s struggle and tries to apply an appropriate 
approach to the peace process in Patani. 
Background of Conflict
Composition of Population
Southern Thailand comprises 14 provinces covering 70.700 square 
kilometers3making up 13.3% of the entire territories of Thailand (Makishima 
2008). In terms of conflict, upheaval occurs only in Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat 
and Songkhla and surrounding areas such as Satun.4 The third largest of the 
conflict region is inhabited by ethnic Malays who make up  1.8 million of 
the population,  which is equivalent to 80% compared with the Thai-Buddhist 
population (McCargo 2007:3). Geographically, these four regions  comprise 
a land area of 13.732 square kilometres and are located at latitude 5’35’ to 
6’55’ north.11 In terms of language, Malay Muslims of Patani (MMP) speak 
three dialects. The first group speaks the Patani Malay dialect and uses Jawi 
or Arabic for writing. The second group comprises those who not only speak 
Thai  but read and write in Thai as well. They consist mostly of the younger 
generation  as a result of the government assimilation of Thailand. The third 
group of people are those who speak the Patani Malay dialect but do not use 
the Jawi script to write and read (Mahmood 1990:118).
Economically, these regions are fertile and rich in natural resources 
such as tin, gas and crude oil. However, these three regions are still behind in 
economic development compared to other regions due to the prolonged political 
turmoil. Residents of the three territories are still under the poverty line where 
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their per capital income is much lower than people in other provinces across 
the country.5 
In terms of education, it is compulsory for them to follow the national
education system based on Thai culture and Buddhist religion. MMP children 
at  preschool level are allowed to receive an education based on Malay culture 
and Islamic religion. However,  from primary school level until university, 
they must follow the curriculum  determined by the government of Thailand. 
To develop the Thai and Malay culture in education, private schools have been 
established by MMP as religious schools and shelters. The curriculum  is based 
on knowledge of Islam  and a little about the Malay culture and language. 
Nevertheless, they are required to teach the Thai language and culture as a 
prerequisite for approval to establish an educational institution. Culturally, they 
practice and adopt Malay culture that is based on the Islamic religion. Most of 
the cultural arts such as attire, traditional games, entertainment, handicrafts 
and others are the same as those practiced by the Malays in Malaysia. In terms 
of culture, they have adopted a Malay culture based on Islam. 
History of Conflict
The conflict began in 1786 when the government successfully conquered the 
kingdom of Siam Patani Sultanate through a series of wars. The conquest 
changed the structure of government and the government of Siam used a 
Divide and Rule policy in Patani. Patani was broken down into seven regions 
and a puppet ruler was appointed for each of the regions, intended to weaken 
the power of the Malays.6 This method  was aimed at decentralization of 
power, initiated by the Europeans. European power became more apparent 
when the French succeeded in conquering the Eastern region of the Mekong 
River in the south (Syukri 2002:81). Similarly, the British government actively 
dominated from the Northeast of Burma, South China and states in North 
Malaya to the Kra Isthmus (Pitsuwan 1982:29). Chulalongkorn, the king of 
Siam formed the Thesaphiban for  centralization of power in Patani. In 1897 
the Minister of Home Affairs issued the policies of District Administration 
known as Phraratchabanyat Pakkhrong Thongti. Two years later this act  was 
further reinforced with the introduction of the regulations on administrative 
region known as Kho Bangkhap Pokkhrong Huamung (Pitsuwan 1982:28). 
Both these acts were generally intended to break the Patani provinces and the 
sovereignty of the Malay rulers. This shift led to the resistance of the Malay 
rulers of the kingdom of Siam as they became aware of their waning powers 
over Patani. The strife came to a peak in 1902 when Tengku Abdul Kadir, a 
king in Patani province was arrested and stripped of his position by the Malay 
rulers in Patani. 
Similarly, the Malay rulers in other provinces also suffered the same 
fate. After being arrested, the Malay rulers of Malay in Patani were stripped 
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of their powers. The Malay rulers  wanted to triumph again to protect their 
rights in Patani, which previously was championed by the aristocracy, but 
later, the struggle included  the religious and local leaders. Their resistance 
involved various strategies including gaining leverage and confidence from 
the British government in Malaya to pressure the government of Siam. Their 
efforts failed when the British  signed the Bangkok Agreement or the Anglo-
Siamese Treaty with Siam in 1909 (Pitsuwan 1982:29). This border agreement 
granted freedom to the kingdom of Siam and left the decision of  Patani without 
British interference. Starting from this point, the Siamese began to  inculcate 
Siamese culture, identity and education into the lives  of the MMP.7 The most 
prominent MMP policy that dealt with the question of identity and culture was 
the Rathaniyom policy introduced by Phibul Songkhram in 1938. According 
to that policy, only Thai cultural characteristics were allowed to grow in 
Thailand.8 MMP had to once again deal with their group of Repressive policies 
which forced people to abandon their Malay-Muslim identity and adopt a Thai-
Buddhist identity. In response to that policy, Haji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir, 
a famous scholar al-Patani established Haiah al-Tanfiziah li al-Ahkam al-
Shariyyah, and implemented Board Shariah Law in 1939. This organization 
was dedicated to creating  scholars in Patani and organizing activities that 
would defend the sanctity of Islam. They  establised a seven-point programme 
to restore peace in Patani (Fathy 1994:80).
Haji Sulong began the struggle  to free  MMP from Thai-Buddhist 
influence and assimilation and enlisted the help of the Patani Malays. Tengku 
Mahmud Mohyideen, a son of Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamaruddin, the last king 
led the MMP to request  the British government to unite Patani with Malaya. 
MMP’s request was refused by the British because the British were more pro- 
Siamese. As a result, the British helped Siam by eliminating movements in 
Malaya, including the Federation Prosecutor Malay Kingdom (GEMPAR)9 
which aimed to help MMP. Tengku Mahmud Mohyideen was instructed not to 
engage in any activities for the separation of Patani.10 British aid had weakened 
the resistance of MMP and allowed the government to threaten  the Malay 
leaders. Many Malay leaders went  missing or were  murdered secretly, including 
Haji Sulong and Tengku Mahmud Mohyideen. Consequently, turbulence was 
controlled by the Kingdom of Siam and subsided with insurgency activities. 
However, by the end of 1960 and by early 1970, the turbulence re-surfaced . 
This agitation was led by groups of separatist movements to gain independence 
as per the aspirations of Malaya in 1957.11 Most of the leaders of this separatist 
movement consisted of individuals who had obtained higher education from 
within and outside the country. They used weapons and violence  in their 
struggle for independence of Patani. Their struggle is still active today, and it is 
believed that the incidences of murder and burning of public property  are not 
only acts by the separatist movement but also by the authorities of Thailand.
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Conflict Issues
Political developments in the three Southern provinces of Thailand were 
plagued by acts such as oppression, discrimination, murder and corruption. 
Anand Panyarachun, former Prime Minister of Thailand and also the director 
of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) when interviewed stated: 
“The main problem in Southern Thailand is political, while social, economic, 
identity is a relatively minor.”12 
Political issues in this conflict  have led to political separation. MMP 
Through the use of weapons to fight the separatist movement to liberate their 
territory from the Thai government, the MMP wanted to form their own 
sovereign government. This issue arose during the post-colonial government 
of Patani Siam in 1786. This situation continued from generation to generation 
among the MMP in the struggle for independence from the government of 
Thailand. Several writings and publications were written on the unrest and 
difficulties of Malay Muslims of Patani (MMP) during the Thai government 
rule. As a result of Thai government involvement in the politics of  Patani, the 
struggles of the MMP  worsened and a lot of violence was reported . Cases of 
missing and dead political leaders was a norm in this conflict, often creating 
tension that culminated in the deaths of many people involved in any particular 
event .13 This struggle for independence began with a high spirit of nationalism. 
Independence was not only about  political power struggle over the three 
regions but included practicing freedom of identity, culture, social, economic 
and education as a minority group. Surin Pitsuwan stated the nature of Patani, 
that Malay Muslims belonged  to the Malay world, but politically, they were 
governed by the Buddhist-centric Thai government  (Pitsuwan 1982:28). These 
claims arose from the Thai government’s decision that denied rights to the 
territories  of the MMP. This denial is based on the constitution of Thailand 
that does not allow any territory in Thailand to have divided sovereignty. So, 
denial was transformed through the policies and approaches that were blocking 
the claim. These policies indirectly formed a barrier and a gap between the 
citizens and the government. Finally, the relations of the two groups were 
polarised because of the Thai government military approach and  formed 
the base for prolonged conflict among them. The Thai government sought  a 
military approach to suppress them and called for temporary reconciliation. 
 The MMP experienced an assimilation process in history, identity 
and culture when the government introduced the Thai policy . Thai-Buddhist 
culture requires all citizens to practice it. The Thai Buddhist government 
applied their own policies which were against the Islamic religion and Malay 
culture.  As a result, the MMP faced several difficulties and a lot of hardship, 
since the Thai government policies were against their Islamic practices. The 
Thai government did not  respect the values of their lives and this influenced the 
MMP to stand up in defence of their rights as Muslim Malays. From a historical 
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perspective, this assimilation started during the regime of Phibul Songkhram 
when he introduced the Rathaniyom and which was continued by subsequent 
leaders. Under this policy, the Malay language and culture was to be abolished, 
marriage laws and faraid were set aside Malay attire was banned while western 
style of dressing was required. At the same time,  the individual’s name as 
well as the province’s name was changed to Siamese spelling (Belitan Sejarah 
2000). For example, Senggora became  Songkhla, Ligor became  Nakhorn Sri 
Thamarat, Becah Herong was changed to Cho Ai Rong, Teluk Hala became 
TaLoHaLO, Bendang Setar was  Ban Nang Sata, Jambu became  Yaring and 
Teluban was renamed  Saiburi. This policy has had a significant impact until 
today. Many of the younger generation no longer enjoy speaking in Malay and 
Thai languages.14 Even then, the MMP still practiced their Muslim culture. For 
example, during the reign of Phibul, there was an attempt to change to  Sharia 
Law from Civil Law but it was not successful. They still practice their religious 
values.
Peace Building: The Relative deprivation and Conflict Transformation
Relative deprivation: the causes of political violence
Relative deprivation refers to the discrepancy between the expected responses 
to the value of capabilities (Gurr 1971:37). As such, it has a specific role and 
functions of the cause of the rebellion. Relative deprivation occurs when people 
push their dream to achieve something even though they are unable to  do so. 
This approach refers to the levels specified value to identify community groups 
or individuals who think and act otherwise in their lives. Relative deprivation 
approach has to do with the cause of the rebellion or revolution in a country. 
According to Edward, all rebellion has insisted on  practicing the elements 
of their wants . Committed acts of violence are in line with the emphasis on 
sustainability  (Edwards 1927:33).
Pettees says, according to his concept of stress, minorities feel stress if they 
are not met with their basic needs such as freedom and security, which are not 
negotiable (Gurr 1971:38). As a result, minorities in a country will revolt if 
they feel their basic rights are being denied .
 One of the elements of the theory of relative deprivation is frustration 
which leads to violence. Within a conflict background, in socio-economic 
development in a country, there is a relationship between behaviour of rebellion 
and their attitudes. Frustration  arises when the government reduces the short-
term socio-economic plan in order to improve the long-term plan. This kind 
of frustration arises when there is an imbalance between the implementation 
of inspiration (Gurr 1971:39). Crozier stated that the key element that causes 
frustration among the rebels is the inability to achieve something, which  is 
different from systematic frustration (Crozier 1960:16). Therefore, inspiration 
will produce unrealistic feeling of frustration, while unrealistic expectations 
Jebat  Volume 40 (2) (December 2013) Page | 29
Aggressive Conflict in Southern Thailand: Roots of Hostility and Aggression
deprivation produces feelings. Frustration can  be tolerated but deprivation 
cannot  be compromised.
 In addition, there are three concepts that can be associated with 
relative deprivation as a cause of violent or aggressive behaviour. First, is 
conflict or Dissonance which uses inconsistent cognitive elements. Cognitive 
elements refer to an individual or community groups and their knowledge 
about the capacity, the actions and the circumstances surrounding them. 
During the conflict period, the government is ready to enforce their policy 
on  the communities (minorities/rebellion) but the community is not ready to 
receive  them. As a result, the minority is likely to change the view of the 
government and will try  to change the leader or government policy through 
political actions. 
Second, is a situation of Anomie, where the expected value is a 
priority in the action by a community group even though the surrounding 
circumstances do not permit it.  Minority groups do not see the development 
of socio-political and economic structure while achieving the desired values. 
Anomie can be detected in the community through the consent of community 
members of the weak against the acceptance of the norms of existing justice. 
Anomie in a society can be categorized into three types -  namely weakness in 
the norms of human life; the existence of strong norms in society but in  conflict 
with each other and thirdly, neglect of the norms of life. Therefore, Anomie 
will contribute to the development of behaviour that violates the norms of civil 
society, ultimately producing  alternative norms in the form of  rebellion.15 
Anomie correlates with deprivation because minorities are  not satisfied  with 
the existing values in the social structure. Agreed values when brought into the 
global context will be faced with limited spaces for survival (Gurr 1971:43). 
Anomie occurs because minorities are still sticking to the normative values of 
the old and are faced  with the norms of the new society (the development of 
the modern world) which  ultimately leads to feelings of frustration and anger. 
       The relative deprivation approach can be attributed to the behaviour 
of the conflict. Conflict can be considered as a process and sometimes as an 
event. Conflict as a process occurs when a minority group struggles  to get 
status, power and scarce resources. The values of restricted conflict prompt 
aggressive action either to ensure that the enemy is  killed, injured or destroyed. 
There is a relative relationship between conflict and the approach of relative 
deprivation theory, because there are shared values and wishes of the group. 
This approach is suitable for discussion of case studies, particularly in the 
transformation that occurred in PLMO due to the effects of structural conflicts 
in Patani.
Jebat  Volume 40 (2) (December 2013) Page | 30
Article: Che Mohd Aziz Yaacob
Patani Liberation Movement Organization (PLMO): BRN, PULO, BIPP 
and GMIP
Barisan Revolusi Nasional Patani (BRN)
It was founded on March 13, 1960 in a famous Islamic institution or in the 
Siamese language, Thamwitya Mulniti in the Yala province. Among its 
founders were Ustad Abdul Karim Hassan,  Dr. Haji Harun, Wan Muhammad 
Dude, DJ Razali Yaacob Aaron, Yussoff Chapakiya, Ahmad Shariff and Abdul 
Qayoom. The National ideology based organizations and Islamic Socialism 
(NASOSI), were influenced by the temperamental Sukarno who was fighting 
for the independence of Indonesia (Abd. Malek 1993:323). The ambition of this 
group was  to form the Republic of Patani and fight for  independence. In terms 
of administration, BRN had  proper administrative order. At the top, BRN was 
led by the Central Chamber (DPP), whose members would  convene to make a 
decision. In addition, there were  several branches of the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces under it like Patani (ABREP), Urban Guerrilla Brigade (GURBAN), 
BRN Congress (KOGAP) and the Revolutionary People’s Commando Team 
Patani (PKRRP).  The establishment of ABREP  which was  under the helm 
of the military wing of BRN was believed to be influenced by the Movement 
Armed Republic of Indonesia (ABRI). This movement was led by Pak Yeh 
carried out  guerrilla attacks and acts of sabotage against the security of 
Thailand. To  further intensify attacks against the security of Thailand, in 1974 
BRN established Guerilla City Brigade (GURBAN). Previously ABREP only 
operated in the vicinity of the villages and remote areas. So, in order to expand 
the scope of their struggles, GURBAN was established to play  a role in a 
series of attacks in the cities. This movement was led by Lukman Iskandar 
and many security forces  stormed ABREP Thailand in collaboration with the 
movement in the villages.
 By 2004, BRN practiced both violence and negotiations in their 
policy in Patani. Armed forces consisted  of young people who continued  their 
missions and struggles with  guidance from the old leadership.16 Labeled as 
Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK) by the Thai government they  carried out mob 
attacks on the military, control posts, bombed  military places together and so 
on.17  BRN changed its policy politically to collaborate with other organizations 
because they had realized that they were alone in their conflict.18 A cooperation 
agreement was sealed between BRN and PULO in terms of division of labor. 
BRN, especially those with strength in Patani at the local level were given the 
mandate to continue performing various operations and activities in the form 
of pressing the Thai government to negotiate. On the other hand, PULO policy 
was  different from BRN. PULO which had  strong relations outside the country 
received  support  in terms of funds to pressure  the Thai government.19 While 
in negotiations with the Government of Thailand, BRN showed a clear change 
when it agreed to hold a dialogue to resolve side issues. However, today BRN 
Jebat  Volume 40 (2) (December 2013) Page | 31
Aggressive Conflict in Southern Thailand: Roots of Hostility and Aggression
is  more open when working and PULO mandated to have a dialogue with the 
government of Thailand. BRN-Congress leadership refused the autonomy but 
they aim to gain independence from the Thai government.20 
Patani National Liberation Front (BNPP)
BNPP was established on October 9, 1970 by Tengku Abdul Jalal and Tengku 
Mahmud Haji Sulong Mohyideen to continue the struggle. But within a short 
time BNPP gave up their struggle because of ideological poverty, and it was 
more concerned with policy aristocracy (Wan Kadir 1990:99). Other parties 
which are members of the BNPP such as Patani Revolutionary Front (BRN), 
Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and Gerakan Melayu Patani 
Raya (GEMPAR) were related groups to BNNPP (Abd. Malek 1993:319). 
This was discovered when  there was no clear and assigned works within 
the movement. This movement was founded by the leading aristocratic and 
religious leaders. Tengku Abdul Jalal and Tengku Abdul Kadir were the 
founders of this organization. The ideological notion of this movement was  to 
liberate Patani and restore the powers of the Malay Sultans who ruled before. 
They were political and radical. To achieve the goals of the struggle, the 
National Liberation Army of The People Patani led by Idris Mat Diah better 
known as Pak Yeh was established under the BNPP. 
This separatist movement of armed forces used guerrilla tactics to 
undermine the security of the Thai government. There were  15 rules in the 
concept of the establishment of this struggle. Among the actions that were 
prohibited were  closing down the rubber plantations, kidnapping, ransom and 
other acts that could cause damage to the public. In addition, every member 
was banned from  mixing with the general public without the consent of the 
Revolutionary Council. They were  Islamist revolutionaries and were ready 
at any time to establish a relationship with  those who loved peace, freedom 
and independence. Moreover, their struggle referred to the Islamic values. In 
1985, BNPP became weak because Wahyuddin Ahmad was not allowed to join 
the organization after three years of his medical leave.21 As a result of this, the 
organization further deteriorated and later the name was changed to  Patani 
Islamic Liberation Front (BIPP). Then, BIPP could continue the struggle with 
a political vision, to get the people prepared  for the independence of Patani.   
After 2004 the organization became inactive. According to Dr. Wan 
Kadir Che Man, one of the former leaders of this organization, he stated that 
he did not speak on behalf of BIPP but rather as a social activist. It is difficult 
to identify the development of the organization because of the absence of new 
leadership and their lack of action. Hence, it can be seen  that the BIPP  with 
the  old leadership was  seen as not wanting to stand up and fight for the 
ongoing struggle.
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Patani United Libertion Organization (PULO)
The Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) was established on 22 
January 1968 under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman or Kadir Kotanila 
Bera. The organization was founded at the University of Aligarh, India but 
later  moved to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia because many students were drawn to 
joining PULO. The name ‘PULO’ is formed by four letters P or letters Pa in 
Jawi. In Arabic it is called al-Munazanah al-Mutahidah Lan Tahrin Fathoni 
which means Patani Liberation Organization Association. In its infancy, this 
movement formed a team known as the Kibas Putih in the Ternal Village, which 
served to expand the ideological struggle among the MMP in Patani province. 
However, the team was not successful and planned to return to Mecca, Saudi 
Arabia.  PULO set up 44 teams to launch guerrilla attacks against government 
military camps. PULO guerrillas were divided by region such as Sri Patani 
(Patani), Sri Hikmah (Narathiwat) and Sri Negara (Yala).22 This organization 
is fighting for UBANGTAPEKMA ideology:
1. Religion  =  Islam is the right path
2. Nation  = Language and culture
3. Nationalism =  Province and the economy
4. Humanitarian =  Identify yourself
Their aim is to live in a free, independent, peaceful and neutral world. Among 
PULO’s calls on the Thai government are:
1. Thai government should return Patani to the MMP to determine 
its  future.
2. All foreigners (Thai, Chinese and others) who dominate the 
Patani economy should  leave Patani.
3. Malay must be the official language or in offices, schools, radio, 
television, newspapers and so on.
4. All military forces should remove their troops from Patani 
(Luqman 2004).
This movement is  well known. It has an organizational structure 
which is divided into several parts. Among others  it has, administrative, 
political, economic, military, religious bureaus and a foreign affairs department. 
Through this systematic governance,  PULO had the opportunity to receive 
financial and military aid from Libya and Syria (Hayimasae 2002:212). The 
administrative structure of the organization was broken down into three main 
parts - the Supreme Administrative Centre, Branch Administration Centre and 
Guerilla Army Operations Centre which was  managed by a chief. In the early 
years, the administrative center was  located in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia with 
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several branches in Malaysia. 
Since 2004, PULO  has been active in fighting for independence in 
Patani. There has been a change in approach and strategy of the organization 
in accordance with  the current political environment. In terms of approach, 
the change can be seen in the short-term plans, long-term plans and other 
activities that have been enshrined in the constitution. Among the important 
facts are the fifth and sixth articles of the PULO constitution which are about 
its relations with global liberation movements and international organizations 
like the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations.23 PULO is 
looking to  intensifying its relations with other  countries, civil societies and 
international organizations. According to this, PULO is extending its policy 
to connect with civil societies. PULO has realized the importance of the role 
of civil society such as academics and NGOs which will support their efforts 
to bring peace to Patani. Therefore, Human Rights and self-determination has 
been included in the  PULO struggle to join the  external world.24 
Gerakan Mujahideen Islamiya Patani (GMIP)
This organization, also known as the United Front Mujahideen Pattani 
(BBMP), was established on 16 September 1985. GMIP was formed because 
Wahyuddin Ahmad was not allowed to rejoin the organization after 3 years of 
medical leave. This organization was oriented according to Islamization based 
on the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 (Farish 2004). It is also a movement 
that is truly based on Islamic principles of Quranul al-Karim, Sunnah, Ijtihad 
Al-Salaf and Ulama al-Salihin. To deal with the Thai government, a peaceful 
approach would be used but if not successful then they would consider the 
Jihad approach. The principals of independence are claimed on :
1. Impact of historical facts: Patani had Malay-Muslim government and 
political relations, economic and trade with foreign countries.
2. The remains of the Patani Sultanate which can be still be  seen today.
3. Multiculturalism and population groups, language and writing, 
religious beliefs and cultural customs.
In accordance with the claims made, GMIP has come out with  some sensible 
and positive steps towards the jihadist movement:
1. Patani Muslims will be involved directly or indirectly in the jihadist 
struggle.
2. Muslims should not forge relations with the Thai government.
3. Execute the armed resistance acts as the situation requires.
4. Take necessary action to join the countries which are interested in 
Thailand.
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5. Taking  the necessary actions to prevent foreign investment in the 
region.
6. Take a new approach with all countries, international organizations, 
the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Organization 
of Non-Aligned Nations, especially the United Nations, to ensure 
support for the independence of  Patani held at international forums
7. Mujahideen Pattani to assure safety and property of all citizens 
regardless of ethnicity and religious beliefs as long as they do not 
oppose this sacred struggle.
8. Mujahideen Pattani will oppose all forms of abuse, oppression, 
tyranny and corruption but instead will act to remove the cause of 
injustice and look out for the welfare of the people.
9. Will plan the economic development policy, education, administration 
and law in Islam, taking into account the interests of other races and 
religion of Islam as a pluralistic society (Abd. Malek 1993:331).
In addition, Wahyuddin Ahmad established the Malay Patani Consultative 
Council (MPRMP) which serves as a platform for the consolidation and 
unification of all Patani liberation movements. It operated as a parliament 
(shadow government) for Patani. Meetings  revealed each party had their 
own agenda and own approach in the conflict. MPRMP provides  room for 
each party representative BRN, PULO, BIPP, GMIP and others to sit at these 
meetings. The result was MMP made their decisions after discussions with 
all groups. MPRMP also acts as a conduit to appoint representatives from 
each party to conduct negotiations with the Thai government. According to 
Wahyuddin Ahmad, MPRMP, this discussion and meeting would  serve as a 
forum to solve the internal problems among the parties.25 He also believes 
that each party will be able to overcome issues and MPRMP will not want to 
interfere in the internal affairs of each party. After 2004, the GIMP and PULO 
worked together under the leadership of Abu Yasir Fikri. Given that GMIP did 
not have young leaders the mandate was then handed to PULO to continue the 
fight for the independence of Patani. The mandate was given together with 
the number of members of armed forces who had been trained by PULO.26 
Cooperation was also recognized by Yazid and Abu Jauwab Hamka as Abu 
Yasir PULO military leadership in an interview. They stated this collaboration 
was  not only official but also acted as the mandate which allowed them to get 
their decisions to PULO.27
Cause and durability Violence: An Analysis of Conflicts in Patani
The aim of this section is to see if there has been a relative deprivation of PLMA 
since 2004, compared  with its early period. Crozier as discussed explained the 
main elements that caused the frustration of the rebels was  the inability to do 
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anything to achieve what they wanted. Inspiration often produced unrealistic 
frustration while unrealistic expectations produced feelings of deprivation. 
In accordance with the Patani case, it is clear that PLMA experienced many 
frustrations in 1960’s and 1970’s because of the failure of government services 
of Haji Sulong and unfair pressure  of the Thai government. The PLMA armed 
uprising was an aggressive action that had experienced a relative deprivation. 
PLMA then realized they had to commence a military struggle to liberate 
Patani but they did not have  enough tactics and weapons to commence their 
struggle. As a result they suffered failure after failure , adding to the growing 
sense of frustration. Abu Jihad the veteran leader in the state BRN had an 
ideology and passion for justice in  Patani but did not know the right method to 
do this. Therefore, it can be understood that PLMA did  not have the capacity 
(skills, knowledge and weapons) to fulfill their dreams of  independence. 
The cultural background and attitude of MMP showed that they had 
enough background to form the independence movement. Patani culture was 
more concerned with relationship but the MMP insisted on the rights of  the 
Patani people. The MMP were  ready to sacrifice  for their struggle. This MMP 
attitude can be compared with the attitudes of the Malays in Satun province 
and the Chin and Mon population in Northern Thailand. Even though they 
faced the experience of suppression by the Thai government, they did not 
react to the government. They  underwent the assimilation process of the Thai 
government. As they  had limited resources, MMP realized their financial 
situation was  limited compared  with other areas.  MMP realized that they 
would fail  even in minor issues. As discussed previously, BRN also faced the 
experience of limited resources. Similarly, because of the protracted dispute 
between the former and new leadership of PULO, the new leader could remove 
the former leader. So, it can be seen that the MMP easily made unrealistic 
decisions.  In other words, the plan for their struggle   was  not well organized 
or systematic.
The Islamic religion  also influenced the formation of these unrealistic 
dreams. As previously discussed, Islam played a role basically in guiding BRN 
or PULO in this dream. The Syariah Court and decisions were a threat to the 
people during this conflict period. Cooperation between BRN and PULO 
caused their people to unite and work together for the sake of Allah. The 
leaders acknowledged that their struggle depended  on the Quran, Hadith and 
Sunnah  for blessings. In the battlefield, the armed troops had a clear idea that 
they were fighting for land and water as sanctioned by Islam. So Islam was the 
main factor that motivated PLMO to form a visible dream.  Even so, members 
of the BRN and PULO believed that Allah Almighty would give them victory 
because they were right and followed the commands of religion.
Finally, in connection with external support for the struggle for 
independence that allowed BRN and PULO to form a dream to achieve it. 
There are two factors that motivate PLMO, the first in terms of both moral 
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support and material support. Moral support refers to similar conflicts that 
arise in other regions. BRN and PULO feel that they are not alone in this 
separation issue. As is already known, there are  two regions in Southeast Asia 
that have experienced conflict namely, the Kingdom of Mindanao and Aceh. 
Libya and Syria supplied military training and arms and ammunitions to the 
PULO. This support  continued into the 1970’s and 1980’s. Many students 
from Patani were sponsored by PULO to study in the Middle East and some 
of them had been absorbed into military service. Haji Roslan, the head of the 
armed forces in PULO was undergoing military knowledge from Libya. The 
experiences in Libya enabled him to serve as a lieutenant general in the army. 
 From each individual corner, the PLMO leadership in early years 
also experienced a relative deprivation. Their attitude had a strong influence 
and impact on society. BNPP organizations, BRN and PULO around the 
80s experienced internal conflict that was serious enough to lead to fallouts 
and fighting. Often, there were many conflicts among the organizations and 
this paved the way for a  split and the  formation of GIMP by Wahyuddin 
Ahmad. Similarly, BRN split into two groups - BRN Coordinate and BRN 
Congress. PULO also suffered the same fate and Dr. Aaron Muleng  left PULO 
and established NewPULO. PULO has been split into three groups. Dr. Wan 
Kadir Che Man under his leadership established the united BIPP for unity and 
coordinated the struggle but this also resulted in failure.  
After 2004, it was found that relative deprivation among PLMO was 
declining. There were a lot of weaknesses and it was difficult to achieve their 
aim. Similarly they focused on  a political and diplomatic approach rather than 
a military approach. Furthermore, BIPP and GIMP gave their mandate to BRN 
and PULO to make  decisions according to their wishes. According to Elliot 
and Hickie, a community will make decisions in their life based on the things 
that are necessary and the possibility of making changes if they are influenced 
by environmental conditions. Decisions made were with regard to material 
social profit and loss when not participating in the government. Based on the 
case of Patani, BRN and PULO were  aware of this weakness of their ability to 
reduce the relative deprivation. To overcome these obstacles in the organization 
it was essential to adopt an open relationship and work together. This kind of 
cooperation was more important on internal and external relations, which are 
skills, knowledge and weapons. Based on these factors BRN, PULO, BIPP and 
GMIP would have to work on the basis of Patani Ummah.  BRN acknowledge 
that their abilities were  still weak and that they needed to cooperate with other 
movements. In the formation of collaborative relationships, the BRN did not 
give priority for ideological struggle as it was deemed unnecessary. So, BRN 
lifted the term and introduced its struggle based on Allah S.W.T. The task has 
been distributed according to ability and their respective advantages. 
PULO with international capabilities mandated by the BRN, can ask 
any kind of help from outside the country and pressure the Thai government. 
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BRN while having in-house capability will be responsible for mobilizing 
people at local and national levels as well as attacks on the security forces for 
the purpose of pressuring the government of Thailand in the country. They see 
that through this partnership they will be able to overcome existing weaknesses, 
particularly in dealing with the government of Thailand. However, there are 
some other contributing factors. Regarding their cultural life, the members 
have informal relationships in the organizations of BRN and PULO.  
Open relationship should be built not only within their civil society but 
also with the Thai government as open relationship is a strategy to overcome 
the drawbacks in terms of weaponry. BRN and PULO as discussed here, 
have  transformed their policies from struggle to diplomacy.  BRN felt the 
need to form relationships with civil society and wanted to learn approaches in 
diplomacy skills like conflict analysis, negotiation, mediation, advocacy and 
others.
According to Elliot and Hickie, the environmental conditions have 
influenced the change in attitudes of the two organizations. BRN and PULO 
were required to change according to the present world order and give up  their 
irrelevant  policies. Kasturi Mahkota explains, PULO changed its policy and 
selected the right approach. He stressed that the PULO should change its policy 
according to the  political world. This was also supported by Haji Roslan who 
says that PULO’s struggle should be founded  on the four basic principles of 
Islam and that they can get support from the Middle East countries and Muslim 
Organizations. Similarly, PULO can gain support from other nations of the 
world on the grounds  of human rights. For BRN, it is  necessary for it to make 
changes on organizational management, strategy, approach, contacts and other 
necessary fields.   
Therefore, based on the above analysis, it can be said that relative 
deprivation experienced by PLMO has gained maturity in their struggle. 
They previously experienced high relative deprivation and it affected their 
own organization and the Patani conflict. But, after 2004, the PLMO suffered 
a decrease in relative deprivation because they had many  weaknesses in 
their struggle. Disappointment has been a leading factor in the  decrease in 
the strength of the struggle. If terror attacks occur , today they are used as 
a  strategy to gain support for negotiations. Therefore, there is no aggression 
based on emotion of PLMO, as a strategy under the intention of getting their 
rights in Patani.
 
Conclusion
The Patani conflict is not something recent as it happened hundreds of years ago. 
This conflict is repetitive and has not been resolved despite various attempts 
made by the government of Thailand. Therefore, it is logical  to decide that this 
is a conflict between two groups which differ in their identity and culture and 
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this has adverse impact on politics. The causes of the political violence in Patani 
involve political domination which has led to a prolonged conflict. Therefore, 
there should be a clear understanding between these groups (Thai and Malay 
Muslim of Patani) in the effort to move the dynamics of human civilization 
on a stronger foundation. Third parties, especially civil society, should play 
their role in this agitation chiefly in leading transformation, particularly in the 
context, structure, issues, actors and personnel in ensuring that these conflicts 
can be overcome and the desired solution achieved by both parties.
End Notes
1. PLMA is a word used by the author to represent all organizations 
in Pattani separatist movement involving the Patani National 
Revolutionary Front (BRN) consisting of BRN and BRN coordinates 
Congress, Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO), Islamic 
Liberation Front (BIPP) and Movement Islamiya Mujahideen Pattani 
(GMIP). According to the study,  of the four organizations, only 
the BRN and PULO are  active at present. Both these organizations 
have used the violence and reconciliation approach in achieving their 
goals in Patani. In terms of hardness approach, they still commit 
armed operations targeting security forces stationed in Patani, while 
conciliatory approach refers to the efforts to build relationships with 
civil society particularly in capacity building and their influence at the 
national, regional and international.
2. Interviewed Wan Kadir Che Man, former Leader of United Front for 
the Independence of Patani (Bersatu) on January, 20, 2011 at Gombak, 
Malaysia.
3. Territories consist of Chumphon, Ranong, Surat Thani, Phangnga, 
Phuket, Krabi, Nakhon Sri Thammarat, Trang, Phathalung, Satun, 
Songkhla, Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat.
4. Some authors and researchers about the Patani conflict use the 
word conflict in Southern Thailand actually do not meet the conflict 
discussion. This is because the conflict only  involves three provinces 
(Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat), while other provinces do not have 
conflicts. Therefore, the author uses the word Patani conflict precisely 
because it represents the conflict. The term ‘Conflicts’ in Patani is used 
as based on historical facts which exist in the Patani Malay sultanate 
before the occupation by the Kingdom of Siam in 1786. Thus, the word 
Patani conflict corresponds  to the conflict situation in the province of 
Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat in Patani before it was taken over by the 
Siamese.
5. Income disparity between regions in spite of having the same economic 
resources. Economic resources in Patani depend on fishing, planting 
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rice, fruit crops and rubber gardening as the geographical location 
bordering the South China Sea and the Andaman Sea and in the middle 
is filled with paddy fields surrounded by hills. However, there were also 
those who participated in the commercial field such as manufacturing 
handicrafts, clothing, food, transportation, farming and retail.
6. Among the regions taken over are   Patani, Nong Chik, Remand, band, 
Watershed, Soaking and Pink.
7. This Agreement is to define the respective colonies specifically 
dominated by the Siamese  previously. As a result of this agreement, 
the state of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu had ceded to the 
British government and the state government was handed over to the 
Kingdom of Siam.
8. From a religious perspective, the Thai government has changed its 
shariah law practiced previously to the secular system. Practicing 
Malay customs is not allowed in everyday life. As a result, cases related 
to shariah such as marriage-divorce and inheritance of the estate will 
be tried in a civil court and judged by judges who are Thai-Buddhist. 
This situation has blocked all Islamic religious functions in the life of 
the MMP. Malay rulers who became the patrons of Islam have been 
removed, while the mosques and religious institutions also have no 
power. Similarly, in hut schools, the curriculum has been modified to 
incorporate Thai language as the medium of instruction and includes 
ethnic Thai trainers. 
9. According to Maher Nik Nik Mahmood, among some of the calls 
made by Haji Sulong is firstly, the appointment of an individual as a 
representative of the kingdom of Siam with full authority to administer 
all four provinces - Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun and has the 
power to dismiss, suspend or replace government officials. This 
individual must be born in one of the four provinces and the appointment 
shall be with the consent of the people in these regions. Second, eighty 
percent of the government officials who will serve in the territories 
are  to be Muslims. Third, Malay and Thai language should be the 
official language. Fourth, the Malay language should be the medium of 
instruction in primary schools. Fifth, Islamic law should be recognized 
and enforced in the Shariah Court. Sixth, all revenues and income 
derived from all four provinces shall be used in the region. Seventh, 
the formation of a body that has full authority to manage the affairs of 
all the Muslims who are under the responsibility of the Head of State.
10. GEMPAR was established in March 1948 in Kota Bharu, Kelantan by 
the people who live in the Land of Patani Malays. Its establishment 
aims to unite the provinces of Patani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun to be 
Malay-Muslim. The second aim isin accordance with the requirements 
of the rule and the establishment of Malay nationalism, Malay customs 
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and religion. The third aim is improve the living standards of the Patani 
Malays to gain rights, justice, freedom and education.
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